A report lists DNSSEC and CAA as missing protections. To understand the warning, follow the two questions they address: “Can we check the information used to find this website?” and “Who is allowed to issue a certificate for its name?” A certificate is an electronic document used when checking a website’s identity for a protected connection. These are different jobs, and neither DNSSEC nor CAA encrypts the conversation with the website. 9 11

Start with the first question. Your device uses the Domain Name System, or DNS, to look up information about the website’s name. DNSSEC adds a way to check that information. 9

Follow a visit to portal.bakery.example. The browser is the program showing pages. Before it can ask the portal for a page, the device asks a lookup helper for the name’s network address. The helper obtains DNS information and returns a destination.

Next, the browser connects to the web service at that destination. For an ordinary certificate-based protected web connection, the service presents its certificate as part of establishing the connection. The address information and the certificate reach different checking steps. 9 11 19

There are therefore two distinct opportunities for additional controls. We can check the published naming information before relying on it. Separately, we can publish restrictions for organizations that issue certificates for the name. To understand why neither control replaces the other, we need to follow each one all the way to its result.

DNSSEC checks the published directions

DNS is rather like a distributed address directory. It provides information such as the network address associated with a name. Now add digitally signed entries. A signature lets a checking system verify where the signed information came from and whether it was altered. The DNS extension that provides this is DNSSEC. 9

A digital signature is not a picture of someone’s handwritten signature. It is a checking value calculated from the information using a private signing key. The corresponding public key lets another system check the signature without learning the private key. Changing the signed address without being able to make a valid new signature causes the check to fail. The public key is deliberately available for checking; publishing it is not publishing the secret needed to sign. 9

Your device’s lookup helper is called a resolver. A resolver that checks DNSSEC uses public checking keys and a chain of signed information leading back to a starting point it already trusts. The chain matters: a signature by an unknown signer alone is not enough. You can think of this as checking both the signed directory entry and the basis for trusting its signer. 9 10

But what stops a false answer carrying a different key and its own matching signature? The helper must establish which signing key belongs to the part of DNS answering its question. It cannot simply trust a key supplied with the answer.

In the usual public DNS arrangement, the helper starts with a key it already trusts. With that key it checks signed information identifying the signing-key information for the next part of the naming system. It checks the next link in the same way and continues toward the domain’s key. Only after checking these links does it use the domain’s key to check the requested data. This linked verification is the chain of trust. It is not a popularity ranking or a promise that the domain holder is honest. 9 10

For the bakery’s portal, a validating helper checks the relevant signed address information rather than merely noticing that a signature exists. If someone changes the answer on its way through the lookup system but cannot satisfy the checks, the helper should not accept it as successfully verified. A browser may then fail to reach the portal rather than be given that answer as trustworthy. That is the protection doing its job, although a broken setup can produce a similar failure. 9 10

This check does not hide the question or answer. DNSSEC authenticates DNS information; it does not encrypt it. Nor does a valid signature mean that the destination runs an honest business or that its software has no faults. If an authorized administrator publishes the wrong destination and the system signs it, the signature cannot recognize the administrator’s business mistake. 9

That is why simply finding a signature record is not the same as successfully checking the relevant information. The usable chain and the verification result matter. During changes to a DNS service, the signing information and the links that establish trust have to remain consistent. DNSSEC is something to maintain, not merely a switch to turn on for a better score. 9 10

“Not signed” and “failed verification” are not the same

Technical reports use four status words that can be confusing. Secure means the relevant information has been successfully verified through a chain reaching a trusted starting point. Insecure means the resolver knows that no such chain reaches the information. It does not mean the website has been hacked. 10

Bogus means the information should be verifiable but the required trust or signature checks fail. An attack is one possible cause; a configuration mistake or damaged information is another. Indeterminate means the resolver cannot decide whether signatures should be expected because it could not obtain the necessary DNSSEC information. “We could not determine it” must not become “the domain definitely has no protection.” 10

For a business reader, the main distinction is between a protection not being established by design, a protection failing when expected, and a check that could not determine the state. Those situations need different explanations. A single red box can hide that difference.

CAA concerns permission to issue certificates

A certificate is a digitally signed statement linking a name to a public cryptographic key, which is information used in checking identity. The organization issuing such certificates is called a certificate authority. A domain holder can publish a DNS rule specifying which authorities are permitted to issue for its name. This record is called CAA, for Certification Authority Authorization. An authority following the CAA specification checks the applicable rule before issuance. 11

Think about the timing. A certificate is arranged before customers need to use it, often by the hosting provider on the business’s behalf. When an authority receives a request to issue one for the portal name, it looks up the applicable CAA information. If that information restricts issuance to another authority, the request is not permitted under that restriction. If it permits this authority, the authority must still perform its other issuance checks. Being on the permitted list is not, by itself, proof that the applicant controls the name. 11

For a concrete example, the bakery permits the authority used by its hosting supplier. A request to a different compliant authority is constrained by that published choice. This narrows the allowed issuing routes; it does not encrypt anything, and it does not make a dishonest issuer technically incapable of disobeying. The restriction depends on authorities looking up and respecting the applicable policy. 11

Suppose your hosting provider arranges certificates through one authority. A CAA restriction can allow that issuer while excluding others. It does not remove the permitted authority’s other checks, and it cannot guarantee that an allowed or noncompliant authority will never make a mistake. If the hosting provider later changes its certificate supplier, the restriction may also need updating so legitimate issuance can continue. 11

A report must check the rule that actually applies. It may come from a higher part of the domain name, and an alias pointing to another name can affect the lookup. Finding nothing at the first name examined is therefore not a complete check. Also, an entry that only supplies an address for reports does not itself restrict issuance. 11

Changing permission does not cancel an existing certificate

CAA acts before a certificate is issued. Removing an authority from today’s rule does not revoke certificates it issued earlier. Revocation means invalidating a certificate through the certificate system’s separate process. Browsers must not use CAA as part of certificate validation; today’s rule might differ from the one in place when a certificate was issued. 11

The two controls can work together because a CAA rule is itself DNS data. DNSSEC can help a validating system check that published rule, just as it can help check address information. Nevertheless, a correctly signed CAA rule allowing the wrong issuer still expresses the wrong choice, and a correctly configured CAA rule does not create DNSSEC protection for the rest of the domain. One protects checking of published data; the other expresses a particular issuance permission. 9 11

During a supplier change, ask who will maintain each part. New DNS signing arrangements must fit the trust links used by checking systems. A new certificate supplier may require a change to the allowed issuer. If an old certificate still works today, that does not establish that its replacement can be issued when needed. Planning these changes is part of keeping the service usable, not simply improving a report’s colours. 10 11

So a sensible reading of the two report items is quite specific: DNSSEC concerns checking DNS data; CAA concerns permission for certificate issuance. A missing control can be worth discussing without proving an attack, and adding both does not establish that an application safely handles your invoices. If a report worries you, start by asking which of these two steps it actually checked and what failed. That is more useful than asking someone to make both boxes green.

Sources

9 — RFC 4033 — DNS Security Introduction and Requirements

11 — RFC 8659 — DNS Certification Authority Authorization Resource Record

10 — RFC 4035 — Protocol Modifications for DNS Security Extensions

19 — RFC 9846 — The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3