An accountant works for a bakery and a bicycle shop. Both use the same invoice service, and both have deliberately given her access. The bakery’s assistant also signs into that service, but her job concerns only the bakery. The accountant should be able to work for both businesses. The assistant should not acquire the accountant’s wider rights merely by using the same software.

This ordinary arrangement explains a less familiar phrase: customer isolation. A shared service must keep customer information separate according to the permissions actually granted. Technical reports sometimes say tenant isolation. A tenant is the customer or organizational space used by the service; it might represent one company, a group or another agreed structure. Separation need not mean a physically separate computer for every customer. The essential question here is who may use which records.

Follow one request for an invoice

The bakery’s assistant opens the invoice service in a browser, the program used to view web pages. She signs into her own account and sees a list of bakery invoices. Behind the screen, her browser asks the provider’s receiving software for information. A message asking for information or work is a request; the returning answer is a response. The receiving software runs on computers often called servers. 13

Suppose she clicks a bakery invoice. Her browser sends a request that identifies the desired document. The receiving service must connect several facts: which account is asking, which action it wants, which invoice is involved, and what relationship gives that account permission. “This account is signed in” is only one fact. “This account may download invoices” still does not answer “May it download this invoice?” Record-level permission must be checked for the action on the particular record. 1

Now imagine the desired document instead belongs to the bicycle shop. The assistant has not been given rights for that company. The same download operation should not release the bicycle shop’s invoice to her. But the accountant can legitimately retrieve it because that business has granted her the relevant access. A person working for several customers is not automatically evidence of a defect; the result must be compared with the intended permissions. 1

This is why the explanation should begin with people’s jobs, not with “nobody can cross a boundary”. Some relationships intentionally cross company spaces. Correct separation supports those relationships while refusing unrelated access. For your business, clarify which company spaces an external accountant manages and which rights ordinary employees have within your own space.

A reference helps locate the document; it does not grant access

To request the right invoice, software needs some way to distinguish it from other stored invoices. The service may assign a number or a long string of characters. Such a reference is an identifier: it tells the program which record is meant. It need not be the invoice number printed for business use.

Think of the distinction between naming a document and being allowed to read it. An identifier solves the naming problem. The permission decision solves the access problem. Making identifiers difficult to predict can be helpful, but it does not replace checking whether the requester may perform the action. Authorization failures can involve sequential numbers, long unpredictable references and other kinds of identifiers. 1

For example, if the provider is asked about an invoice identified by a long reference, the safe result should not depend solely on the belief that the assistant would never know that reference. The intended rule is that she cannot obtain the bicycle shop’s invoice because she lacks permission. A provider should be able to explain that rule without asking you to discover a real customer’s reference.

Do not experiment by changing invoice links in the live service. Those references can designate real documents. An understandable demonstration can instead supply the relevant references for invented records in an authorized test environment. There is no need to search for another company’s actual invoice.

The document can leave the main screen by several routes

A correct invoice list is useful, but it is only the first view. The service might also offer attachments, search results or exports. An attachment is an additional file associated with the invoice. An export collects records into a file that can be taken away or used in another program. If these functions expose the same customer records, they must respect the intended permission relationships too. A restricted list does not explain every other operation. 1

Consider a month-end export for the bakery. The assistant requests it, and the service says it will be ready later. The provider has placed the work into a queue: a list of jobs waiting to be performed. A later process builds the file, then the assistant retrieves it. That gives us several points to understand: whose records are selected, what goes into the file, and who may obtain the finished file.

The immediate message “request refused” would not be enough if an unwanted export was nevertheless created afterward. During an authorized assessment, the team should inspect the resulting records and files as well as immediate responses. API security guidance recognizes that assessing effects can be necessary when an answer alone does not reveal what changed. The delayed export is an explanatory example, not a claim that a particular supplier has this defect. 3

Access can also differ within an allowed document. The assistant might need an invoice total but not management’s internal dispute note. A field is an individual item of information in a record. Checking which record may be opened and checking which fields may be returned or changed are related but distinct decisions. 3

Demonstrate the intended relationships without real customer data

Ask the provider to reproduce the bakery and bicycle-shop arrangement in a separate, expressly authorized test environment. Use fictional company spaces, temporary accounts and invented invoices. Agree the small set of operations, expected results and stopping conditions before the exercise. Unexpected real information is a reason to stop.

The bakery assistant’s test account should receive the permitted bakery document and be refused the bicycle shop’s document. The accountant’s test account should do the agreed work for both. If the demonstration includes an export or attachment, inspect that outcome too, including work waiting in the queue. This is a demonstration for the provider’s authorized team, not a guide for probing the live service.

A successful example supports a conclusion about that example. It is not a guarantee about all features or future changes. A failed example establishes a problem in the tested path, not a historical leak affecting every customer. Ask whether similar permission checks are tested when the software changes; OWASP recommends authorization tests and avoiding deployment of changes that break them. 1

Peppol transport remains a different stage. An Access Point is a network service that sends or receives Peppol messages; the AS4 profile describes the exchange between Access Points. It does not automatically settle later access through a customer portal or through the customer API, the agreed interface used by your accounting program to request work or information from the provider. 10

Use the accountant-and-assistant example in your next access discussion. It lets you describe useful separation concretely: authorized cooperation for both clients, without turning every valid login into access to every invoice.

Sources

13 — MDN: Overview of HTTP — client/server requests, responses and sessions

1 — OWASP API1:2023 Broken Object Level Authorization

3 — OWASP API3:2023 Broken Object Property Level Authorization

10 — OpenPeppol AS4 Profile 2.0.3