The invoice number matches your records. The amount is what you expected. The email says only one thing has changed: the supplier now wants payment into a different bank account. It asks you to use the new details today.
You do not have to decide whether the whole invoice is fake before pausing that change. A correct invoice and a fraudulent payment destination can appear together. The question to resolve is narrower: has the supplier really authorized this new account?
Why checking the email is not enough
There are several ways to make a request look familiar. A sender can imitate a person’s displayed name, use a different domain that resembles the supplier’s, or gain access to the supplier’s actual account. The last possibility is especially important: the FBI describes business email compromise involving legitimate business accounts taken over by criminals. 6 12
The receiving mail service can perform three technical checks. It can compare the sending computer with a domain’s sending permission; this is SPF. It can verify a digital mark attached by a sending service; this is DKIM. DMARC then asks whether a successful check supports the domain in the visible sender address. A domain is the name after @, as example.com is in [email protected].
These checks help establish technical origin. None checks the business decision to replace a bank account. If a criminal uses a genuine account through its normal service, the message can pass the domain checks. That is why a payment change still needs its own confirmation. 6 12
The difference between imitation and takeover matters. An imitation might come from another address while displaying the supplier’s familiar name. A takeover can use the real mailbox and ordinary sending process. A mail server is the computer running that process; it can handle a message submitted from the account without knowing whether the person currently controlling the account is the intended employee. Checking the message’s route therefore cannot substitute for checking the employee’s payment authority. 6 12
A useful comparison is a call made from somebody’s office phone. Knowing which office the call came from does not establish that the person speaking had permission to approve a payment change. With email, recognizing the route and approving the instruction are also separate decisions.
So the receiving system can help answer “Did this message pass the domain checks?” It cannot answer “Did the supplier’s authorized finance contact agree to this account?” That second question needs a different source of confirmation.
Give the account change its own decision
A workable approach is to keep processing the invoice while holding the proposed change separately. Compare the goods or work with what you ordered in the usual way. Do not silently replace the saved bank details just because the new ones arrived beside a correct invoice.
For example, the business has already received the goods and owes the expected amount. Its supplier record contains the previously agreed bank account. The new email asks for a different account. There are now two tasks: decide whether the invoice is payable under the normal purchasing process, and decide whether the proposed replacement account is authorized. Passing the first task does not supply evidence for the second. Keeping them separate lets the employee describe the issue accurately: “The invoice matches; the new payment destination still needs confirmation.” Nobody needs to accuse the supplier of dishonesty to pause an unverified change.
This does not mean blindly paying the old account despite a possible genuine closure or other problem. If the destination is uncertain, pause the affected payment and escalate through your agreed process. The aim is to resolve where the supplier expects payment before sending money, not to turn one unverified instruction into another. Urgent confirmation can happen without treating urgency itself as confirmation.
This separation also avoids circular checking. If someone first copies the new account into the supplier record and a colleague later checks the payment against that updated record, both screens agree. But they agree because they came from the same request, not because the account was independently confirmed.
A second reviewer is useful when they check how the change was confirmed, not merely whether somebody typed the same digits twice. In a small business that reviewer might be the owner. The process can stay short: what changed, who confirmed it through which known route, and who approved its use.
Use a contact the request did not supply
The FBI recommends verifying changes to account information through a secondary channel. 12 A practical way to apply that principle is to call the supplier using contact details already established before the request arrived. Reach someone authorized to confirm the change, not merely anyone who answers.
The independence matters more than the device. Calling a new number printed in the questionable email may simply connect you to the person who wrote it. Moving from email to telephone has not created an independent check if the same request supplied both the account and the phone number.
The same reasoning applies to “confirm it in our new secure portal”. A link in the request cannot establish its own trustworthiness. If you normally use a supplier portal, reach it through your existing bookmark or other known access route and use the agreed confirmation process there.
During the call, make clear that you are confirming a change, not just asking whether an invoice exists. For our example, “Did your authorized finance team request replacement of the payment account for this invoice, and what are the confirmed details?” addresses the issue. “Did you send us an invoice?” does not: the genuine invoice may be exactly what made the false instruction believable. Follow the supplier’s established authorization arrangement if the person answering cannot confirm the change.
A second internal reviewer can then read the short confirmation record and check that the known contact route was used. Comparing only the last digits on the email and payment screen tests copying accuracy. Checking where the confirmation came from tests whether the business had a reason to accept the change. Both tasks can matter, but they solve different problems.
When the established contact is unavailable, the change remains unconfirmed. A deadline can be a reason to reach the owner or another authorized contact promptly; it is not evidence that the new details are genuine. Staff need permission to pause an unusual change without being blamed for failing to act quickly enough.
Once the change is confirmed, record a short note of the contact, time, confirmation route and internal approval. Then update the supplier information through the normal process. The point is not a long form. It is being able to explain why the new account was accepted.
If the payment has already gone
Contact the bank that sent the transfer immediately when fraud is suspected. Ask what can be done to recall or reverse the payment and provide the requested transaction details. Prompt contact may help limit the loss, but recovery is not guaranteed. Do not wait for a complete explanation of the email before calling the bank. 12
At the same time, preserve the original message and payment references rather than relying only on a screenshot. Tell the person responsible for your mail system if an account may have been taken over. Keep the information within the people handling the incident instead of forwarding the invoice around for opinions.
Use the relevant official fraud-reporting route as well as the bank’s process. IC3, the FBI service cited here, is a United States reporting channel; it should not be mistaken for the local police reporting route in every country. 12
The ordinary habit to build is modest: treat a new payment destination as a separate decision, even when everything else looks familiar. An email can deliver the request. Confirmation through an established independent route gives your business a reason to accept it.